The Sixth District Court of Appeal held that a medical marijuana dispensary could recover its marijuana plants seized by law enforcement, finding that violation of the ordinance did not render medical marijuana plants “contraband” per se and subject to seizure. Granny Purps, Inc. v County of Santa Cruz, 53 Cal.App.5th 1 (2020).
Under established caselaw,
An action for breach of a statutory development agreement should be reviewed as a breach-of-contract case, not as an administrative law proceeding in which the court gives deference to the City’s findings. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16105 (9th Cir., May 26, 2020).
The City of Oakland entered into a statutory development agreement with the plaintiff to redevelop a portion of the decommissioned Oakland Army Base as a commercial shipping terminal. While development agreements generally freeze existing regulations in place, this agreement provided that the city could adopt and apply new regulations if the City determined “based on substantial evidence and after a public hearing that a failure to do so would place existing or future occupants or users . . . neighbors, in a condition substantially dangerous to health or safety.”
Subsequently, in response to public opposition to shipping coal through the terminal, the City Council held public hearings, analyzed evidence presented by experts, and approved an ordinance prohibiting coal shipping. The City Council adopted factual findings in support of its determination that shipment of coal created a substantially dangerous health or safety condition.
The appeal turned on whether the case should be treated as a breach-of-contract action (in which the trial court makes factual findings based on the evidence presented at trial, which are accorded deference on appeal) or as an administrative law proceeding (in which the evidence is limited to the record before the agency and the agency’s factual findings upheld if supported by substantial evidence). The court concluded that administrative law principles should not apply in a breach-of-contract action because, among other things, deferring to the government agency’s findings would “effectively create an escape hatch for the government to walk away from contractual obligations” through “self-serving regulatory findings insulated by judicial deference . . . .” The court therefore concluded that the trial court owed no deference to the City’s factual determinations and did not err in considering evidence not presented at the public hearings to “shed light on the adequacy of the evidence that was actually before the City Council.”
Continue Reading Suit for Breach of Development Agreement Should Be Treated as a Breach-of-Contract Action, Not an Administrative Law Proceeding
The court of appeal rejected a claim that a Coastal Development Permit should be invalidated because it was based on intentional misrepresentations, finding that even if accurate and complete information had been submitted, this would not have caused the Coastal Commission to deny the application or require additional or different conditions. Hubbard v. California Coastal
On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) global pandemic, seven counties – Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz – issued orders requiring residents to shelter in place and mandating closure of many businesses. The orders exempt certain “essential” business operations, which include the “construction of housing,” from these restrictions. This article addresses the narrow question whether and to what extent the orders allow or prohibit activities related to the construction of housing.
The exact wording of each order differs slightly, but the substance is the same. Each contains language similar to the following:
For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence to provide any services or perform any work necessary to the operations and maintenance of “Essential Infrastructure,” including, but not limited to, public works construction, construction of housing (in particular affordable housing or housing for individuals experiencing homelessness), airport operations, water, sewer, gas [and] electrical . . . provided that they carry out those services or that work in compliance with Social Distancing Requirements as defined this Section, to the extent possible.
The orders are new and untested. We expect to learn more in the next few days about how the orders will be interpreted and applied. However, applying common-sense meanings in light of the intent of the orders to allow continued homebuilding appears appropriate.
Work “Necessary” to Housing Construction. The orders expressly exempt housing construction activities, as confirmed in notices being distributed by some (but not all) city and county officials. The details of exactly which associated services are exempted is less clear. The California Building Industry Association is taking the position that permit, inspection and other services are also “necessary” to accomplish the construction of housing and therefore exempt, including plan checks, issuance of building and grading permits, inspections for permits and certificates of occupancy, utility hook-ups, and recordation of necessary documents such as mechanics liens, tax liens, easements, financing instruments, covenants, conditions and restrictions, and title transfers. The issue of whether title companies and recordation offices may remain open is especially complicated in light of factors other than these orders, but the position taken by the CBIA comports with the literal language of the orders. Another issue not expressly addressed is whether activities needed for occupancy of a residence, such as appraisals, home inspections, and visits by prospective homebuyers or tenants, may occur. The intent of the orders supports the conclusion that these activities are exempt as well.
Continue Reading COVID-19 Shelter-In-Place Orders Exempt Activities Necessary for the Construction of Housing
A court could properly direct a city council to correct internal inconsistencies in its general plan resulting from adoption of an initiative. Denham, LLC v. City of Richmond, 41 Cal. App. 5th 340 (2019).
The Richmond City Council adopted an initiative, approved by 10 % of the City’s voters, without alteration in accordance with Elections
The City of Sacramento did not violate constitutional law or implied-in-law zoning contract when it approved a project with characteristics that deviated from the City’s zoning ordinance. Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of Sacramento, 37 Cal. App. 5th 698 (2019)
A developer sought approval to build a high-rise tower in Midtown Sacramento. The City’s
The statewide concerns underlying the affordable housing provisions of the Surplus Lands Act superseded municipal home rule authority on the same subject and hence required charter cities to comply with the affordable housing provisions of the Act. Anderson v. City of San José, 42 Cal.App.5th 683 (2019).
This case addressed whether state constitutional authority
The United States Supreme Court overturned a 34-year-old precedent established by Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, holding that landowners pursuing takings claims need not seek redress in state courts before pursuing a federal claim. Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17–647 (U.S. S.Ct. Jun. 21, 2019).
The Knick decision arose from a