A local agency’s environmental impact report must identify any areas on a project site that might qualify as “Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Areas” under the California Coastal Act, and must account for those areas in the EIR’s analysis of project alternatives and mitigation measures.  Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach, California Supreme Court

A Summary Of Published Appellate Opinions Under The California Environmental Quality Act

In 2016, the California appellate courts issued published opinions in 21 CEQA cases. In several of those opinions, including a ground-breaking decision by the California Supreme Court, the courts grappled with limits on the scope of required environmental review for a subsequent project

The First District Court of Appeal has upheld the San Francisco Bay Area’s Sustainable Communities Strategy.  The court rejected  the claim that such strategies  must account for the effects of statewide greenhouse gas reduction mandates. Bay Area Citizens v. Association of Bay Area Governments, 248 Cal. App. 4th 966 (2016).

The Sustainable Communities and

A Summary of Published Appellate Opinions Under the California Environmental Quality Act

In 2015, the California appellate courts continued to chart new ground as they grappled with some of CEQA’s most difficult and controversial questions. The  Supreme Court of California led the way, issuing four opinions on hotly contested issues. For the first time, the

The California State University system may not condition its funding of mitigation for off-site impacts of a campus expansion project on receipt of a legislative appropriation earmarked for that purpose, according to a decision issued yesterday by the California Supreme Court. City of San Diego v Board of Trustees of the California State University, No. S199557 (Cal. Supr. Ct. Aug. 3, 2015). The effect of the decision is that state agencies will have to look to existing appropriations and other available sources to fund off-site mitigation for projects they undertake, and will be precluded from shifting the cost of mitigation to regional and local agencies simply because the Legislature has not appropriated specific funds for mitigation. The court’s opinion does, however, leave a key question unanswered: When can a public agency considering one of its own projects decide that a measure designed to mitigate one of its significant environmental impacts is economically infeasible?

Background.

The case involved a challenge to the environmental impact report for a plan to expand the San Diego State University campus. The plan calls for housing for faculty and staff; a hotel and campus conference center; new student housing; expansion and renovation of the student union; and new buildings for academic, research and medical use, along with a supporting parking structure.

The EIR found that the expansion project would worsen congestion on city streets and a nearby freeway. The CSU Board agreed with the city and CalTrans on the University’s fair share of the cost of mitigation – about $15 million — but declined to commit the funding, taking the position that the University is required to pay for off-campus mitigation only if the Legislature appropriates funds specifically for that purpose.

Reasoning that the Legislature might not appropriate funds for mitigation, the Board determined that off-campus traffic mitigation was infeasible and adopted a statement of overriding considerations.

No legal support for University’s determination off-site mitigation is infeasible.

The California Supreme Court unanimously rejected the University’s legal arguments, concluding that:

  • The court’s 2006 decision discussing the University’s duties under CEQA to mitigate environmental impacts through fair-share payments (City of Marina v Board of Trustees) did not support the Board’s claim that the University may lawfully contribute funds for off-campus mitigation only through a legislative appropriation earmarked for that purpose.
  • Most of the proposed new campus facilities will be financed with non-appropriated funds through revenue bonds, student fees, donations, and joint ventures with private interests. The University’s authority to undertake such projects necessarily includes the authority to budget for mitigation costs.
  • The expansion plan EIR calls for a variety of on-site mitigation measures that will be funded through project budgets. There is no reason to conclude that off-site mitigation measures cannot be funded the same way. CEQA does not draw a distinction between on-site impacts and off-site impacts, and instead refers to the environment as the entire area that “will be affected by a proposed project.”
  • CEQA expressly subjects the Board‘s decisions concerning campus master plans to its requirements and does not exempt those plans from the duty CEQA imposes to mitigate significant environmental impacts when it is feasible to do so.

Continue Reading A State Agency’s Duty To Mitigate Significant Environmental Impacts Does Not Depend On A Legislative Appropriation Of Funds For Mitigation

A city cannot prohibit development on more than one-third of an otherwise developable site in anticipation of future condemnation of that portion of the property. Such a restriction denies the landowner all economically beneficial use of the restricted land and constitutes a taking requiring just compensation. Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio, No. G049899 (4th App. Dist., April 21, 2015).

Jefferson Street Ventures owned a vacant 27-acre parcel that included the site of a long-proposed highway interchange project. In 2005, Jefferson submitted a proposal to the City to develop a retail shopping center on its entire parcel. At the time, the federal and state agencies involved in the interchange project were in the process of completing environmental reviews to satisfy NEPA and CEQA. The City could not acquire property for the interchange until the environmental reviews were completed.

The City Council did not approve development of the entire 27-acre parcel, but rather conditioned approval of Jefferson’s master plan on leaving nine acres for the future interchange undeveloped and reserving a two-acre temporary no-build area for a highway off-ramp during the interchange construction. The City Council included the conditions based on the advice of its staff that it would be much more expensive to acquire property for the interchange project if Jefferson developed the entire site because the City would then incur additional condemnation costs for demolition of buildings and relocation of tenants

The court of appeal held that the City’s conditional approval of Jefferson’s development plan resulted in an uncompensated taking of the 11 acres. A regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of its property is a per se taking that requires just compensation. Under all applicable land use regulations, Jefferson’s entire 27-acre property was developable, and its master plan was in full compliance with governing regulations.
Continue Reading Don’t Bank On It: Court of Appeal Takes Issue with City’s Development Prohibition

A court of appeal has held that the first-ever environmental impact report for the state’s fish hatchery and stocking programs complies with CEQA, but also found that three of the EIR’s mitigation measures constituted “underground regulations” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish and Wildlife, Third Appellate District Case No. C072486.

The Fish-Stocking Programs. Since the late 19th century, the Department of Fish and Wildlife has been required by statute to conduct a massive fish hatchery and stocking program. But hatchery trout introduced into mountain lakes contribute to declining amphibian populations, and hatchery salmon and steelhead are causing hybridization, which reduces the genetic diversity and strength of the fish species. As the result of a CEQA lawsuit, the Department was required to prepare its first EIR on the state-mandated program; the Department also decided to include in the EIR several other programs, including one that authorizes fish stocking in lakes and ponds by private aquaculture facilities.

The Program EIR. The Department prepared a program EIR that analyzed the program’s species impacts on a statewide, rather than a site-by-site, basis. The EIR included protocols and plans for discovering and mitigating site-specific impacts at the nearly 1,000 water bodies the Department stocks and the 24 hatcheries it oversees. The EIR’s baseline for environmental review, and its no-project alternative, was ongoing operation of the program as it had functioned from 2004-2008.

As for the private fish stocking programs, the EIR identified, and the Department adopted, new prerequisites and monitoring and reporting obligations for private vendors.
Continue Reading California Department of Fish and Wildlife’s EIR for Fish-Stocking and Hatchery Program Upheld

The California Supreme Court has issued its long-awaited decision in Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley, No. S201116 (March 2, 2015). The Court’s decision clears up some of the ambiguity that has surrounded the standard of review for challenges to CEQA exemptions under the unusual circumstances exception. In doing so, the Court rejected the controversial approach taken by the court of appeal and instead opted for a middle ground, balancing the interest in giving effect to the legislatively-mandated exemptions against CEQA’s overarching goal of ensuring review of significant environmental effects.

Background

The project at issue was a large house to be built in the City of Berkeley. The city granted a use permit and found the project exempt from CEQA under the Class 3 (construction and location of limited numbers of new, small facilities or structures) and Class 32 (in-fill development) exemptions. The city also determined that none of the exceptions to categorical exemptions listed in CEQA Guidelines section 15300.2 were triggered, including the exception for a “significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” An organization sued, alleging, among other things, that the exemptions were barred by the unusual circumstances exception.

The court of appeal overturned the City’s exemption determination, holding that the possibility that a proposed activity might have a significant effect on the environment “is itself an unusual circumstance,” barring reliance on a categorical exemption.

A Potentially Significant Environmental Effect Alone Is Not Sufficient to Trigger the Unusual Circumstances Exception.

The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a party bringing a challenge under the unusual circumstances exception must establish both 1) that there are unusual circumstances that justify removing the project from the exempt class; and 2) that there is a reasonable possibility of significant environmental impacts due to those unusual circumstances.

The Court began by examining the text of section 15300.2, which provides: “A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” According to the Court, the plain language of this provision supported the view that there must be some showing of unusual circumstances for this exception to apply. The court of appeal’s interpretation would, the Court found, render the phrase “due to unusual circumstances” mere surplusage.

The Court further found that under the court of appeal’s interpretation, the categorical exemptions would have little, if any, effect. The Court noted that under CEQA section 21080(c) and (d) and Guidelines section 15061(b)(3), when there is no substantial evidence that an activity will have a significant effect on the environment, “further CEQA review is unnecessary; no CEQA exemption is necessary to establish that proposition.” Thus, under the court of appeal’s interpretation, the categorical exemptions would serve no purpose, applying only when the proposed project is already outside the scope of CEQA review.
Continue Reading California Supreme Court Upholds Most Commonly Used CEQA Categorical Exemptions

In a long-awaited 2-1 decision, a court of appeal overturned the environmental impact report for the San Diego Association of Governments’ 2050 Regional Transportation Plan and Sustainable Communities Strategy. Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (4th Dist., Div. 1, No. D063288, Nov. 24. 2014).   The most remarkable ruling, in what is likely to be viewed as a highly controversial decision, is the majority’s finding that the EIR was deficient because it did not assess the plan’s consistency with the 2050 greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal contained in an executive order issued by the Governor in 2005.

Background of the Plan and SB 375

The decision concerns SANDAG’s Regional Transportation Plan which contains the Sustainable Communities Strategy required by SB 375. When it enacted SB 375, the Legislature recognized that cars and light duty trucks emit 30% of the state’s greenhouse gases. Accordingly, SB 375 required the Air Resources Board to establish greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets applicable to cars and light duty trucks for each of the state’s metropolitan planning regions. The initial targets set goals for the years 2020 and 2035. SB 375 requires the Air Resources Board to consider new targets every eight years. The targets set for the San Diego area required a 7 percent CO2 reduction by 2020 and a 13 percent reduction by 2035.

In addition, the Legislature recognized that to achieve these targets, changes would need to be made to land use patterns and policies. For this reason, SB 375 also required Regional Transportation Plans to include land use-related strategies for achieving the targets, called Sustainable Communities Strategies. The SANDAG Regional Transportation Plan was the first in the state to be adopted with a Sustainable Communities Strategy.

The plan, however, drew fire. While it showed greenhouse gas emissions reductions through 2020, it also showed increases in greenhouse gas emissions after that date. Project opponents argued this was inconsistent with SB 375’s goals, the policy in AB 32 requiring that emissions reductions achieved by 2020 be maintained past that date, and an executive order targeting larger scale emissions reductions by 2050.

EIR’s Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

In 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger issued an executive order establishing statewide targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions that included reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.  The EIR found that SANDAG’s plan would reduce greenhouse gas emissions until 2020, but would increase them in later years.  While it discussed the 2050 emissions reduction target in the executive order, it did not treat the order’s 2050 emissions reduction target as a standard for assessing the significance of the plan’s greenhouse gas impacts.

The court’s majority agreed with the plan opponents held that the EIR’s greenhouse gas impacts analysis was inadequate for failing to analyze the plan’s consistency with the executive order. While the executive order was not a legislative enactment, and established only statewide rather than regional emissions reduction targets, the majority reasoned that the executive order led to later legislation that  “validated and ratified the executive order’s overarching goal of ongoing emissions reductions,” and therefore the executive order continues to “underpin the state’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions throughout the life of the transportation plan.”  According to the majority, the absence of an analysis comparing the plan with the executive order’s 2050 emissions reduction target amounted to “a failure to analyze the Plan’s consistency with state climate policy.”
Continue Reading EIR For SANDAG’s Regional Transportation Plan Rejected By Court Of Appeal