The court of appeal held that a secondary easement right exists only to the extent necessary to effectuate the principal easement described in the document creating the principal easement. Pear v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal.App.5th 61 (2021).

In 1951, the plaintiffs’ grandparents executed a deed granting the City and County

The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that that while most of the California Coastal Commission’s conditions for construction of a home on an oceanfront lot were reasonable, a requirement that the home be removed from the parcel “if any government agency orders it not to be occupied due to a natural hazard” was “overbroad,

Once again, the City and County of San Francisco has been found to have exceeded the limits of its authority under the Ellis Act in its efforts to deter conversion of residential rental units. Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute v. City and County of San Francisco, 22 Cal. App. 5th 77 (2018).

The Ellis Act prohibits local governments from “compel[ling] the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer accommodations in the property for rent or lease.” (Gov’t Code § 7060(a).)  Courts have held that the Ellis Act completely occupies the field of substantive eviction controls over landlords who withdraw units from the market and prohibits local ordinances that penalize the exercise of rights established by the statute.

The ordinance challenged in this case modified the City’s Planning Code to permit enlargement, alteration or reconstruction of nonconforming residential units in zoning districts where residential use was principally permitted, but imposed a 10-year waiting period for units that had been the subject of a “no fault” eviction. Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute (“SPOSFI”) sued, claiming that the imposition of a 10-year waiting period penalized the exercise of the right to exit the rental business and therefore conflicted with and was preempted by the Ellis Act.
Continue Reading Another San Francisco Ordinance Falls To The Ellis Act

A homeowner who invoked his HOA’s dispute resolution process regarding tree-trimming requirements and was sued by another homeowner based on that application could successfully bring an anti-SLAPP motion on the ground that the suit interfered with exercise of First Amendment rights.  Colyear v Rolling Hills Community Association of Rancho Palos Verdes, No. B270396 (2

The Court of Appeal ruled that the Ellis Act preempted measures mandating relocation assistance payments of “the difference between the tenant’s current rent and the prevailing rent for a comparable apartment in San Francisco over a two-year period” because such mitigation constituted a prohibitive price for landlords to exit the rental business. Coyne v. City

A Summary of Published Appellate Opinions Under the California Environmental Quality Act

In 2015, the California appellate courts continued to chart new ground as they grappled with some of CEQA’s most difficult and controversial questions. The  Supreme Court of California led the way, issuing four opinions on hotly contested issues. For the first time, the

A city may deny a proposed mobilehome park subdivision that is inconsistent with the open space element of its general plan, according to the recent court of appeal decision in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson, No. B25011 ( Second Dist. August 21, 2015.)

Carson Harbor Village applied to the City of Carson to convert its mobilehome park to a subdivision of resident-owned lots. The park consists of 420 rental spaces on 70 acres, 17 of which are federally and state regulated wetlands, and the only open space within the city.

The city rejected the park’s application, finding, among other things, that the proposed subdivision was inconsistent with the open space element of its general plan. Carson Harbor filed suit, and the trial court overturned the city’s decision. The court ruled that inconsistency with the city’s general plan was not a valid ground to deny the application under the state statute which governs mobilehome park conversions, Government Code section 66427.5. The court also found that, in any event, there was no evidence of a conflict.

The court of appeal reversed, holding that inconsistency with the city’s general plan was a legally permissible basis for denying the application, and that the city’s finding of inconsistency was supported by sufficient evidence.

In finding that the mobilehome park conversion statute does not prevent local agencies from considering consistency with the general plan when acting on a conversion application, the court of appeal applied the reasoning of a recent California Supreme Court decision in which the court considered whether a proposal to subdivide a mobilehome park in the coastal zone was subject to the Coastal Act and the Mello Act. Looking to the important policy considerations embodied in the Coastal Act and the Mello Act, the supreme court found that those policies favored an interpretation of the conversion statute that did not strip away Coastal Act and Mello Act jurisdiction over land use within the coastal zone.
Continue Reading Risks to Open Space Designated in General Plan’s Open Space Element a Valid Ground for Denying Application to Subdivide a Mobilehome Park

A water district is not subject to the same vesting rights as a local agency under the Subdivision Map Act. Thus, the Subdivision Map Act does not restrict a municipal utility district’s authority to require an easement as a condition of providing water service to a residential lot on a newly-subdivided parcel. Tarbet v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, First Appellate District Case No. A140755, April 29, 2015.

In 2005, the County of Alameda approved a parcel map which subdivided a parcel into three lots. A condition of approval required that that each lot be connected to the East Bay Municipal Water District water system and the parcel map included an easement for a District water main. When the subdivider sought a letter confirming that water service would be available for each lot, the District indicated it would provide water service contingent upon compliance with its regulations.

Tarbet bought one of the lots and applied for water service. The District provided a water service estimate for installing a service connection, based on an additional 15-foot easement onto Tarbet’s property for the installation and maintenance of a water main and drain valve. Tarbet rejected the requested easement, and the District consequently refused to provide service.
Continue Reading Vesting Rights Restrictions of Subdivision Map Act Do Not Bind Water District